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Abstract
We study computational aspects of three prominent voting
rules that use approval ballots to elect multiple winners.
These rules are satisfaction approval voting, proportional ap-
proval voting, and reweighted approval voting. We first show
that computing the winner for proportional approval voting is
NP-hard, closing a long standing open problem. As none of
the rules are strategyproof, even for dichotomous preferences,
we study various strategic aspects of the rules. In particu-
lar, we examine the computational complexity of computing
a best response for both a single agent and a group of agents.
In many settings, we show that it is NP-hard for an agent or
agents to compute how best to vote given a fixed set of ap-
proval ballots from the other agents.
Introduction
The aggregation of possibly conflicting preference is a
central problem in artificial intelligence (Conitzer 2010).
Agents express preferences over candidates and a voting rule
selects a winner or winners based on these preferences. We
focus here on rules that select k winners where k is fixed
in advance. This covers settings including parliamentary
elections, the hiring of faculty members, and movie rec-
ommendation systems (Obraztsova, Zick, and Elkind 2013).
Multi-winner rules can also be used to select a com-
mittee (Ratliff 2006; LeGrand, Markakis, and Mehta 2007;
Elkind, Lang, and Saffidine 2011).
Generally, in approval-based voting rules, an agent ap-
proves of (votes for) a subset of the candidates. The most
straightforward way to aggregate these votes is to have ev-
ery approval for a candidate contribute one point to that can-
didate; yielding the rule known as Approval Voting (AV ).
Approval Voting is an obvious type of voting rule to extend
from the single winner to the multiple winner case. Un-
like, say, plurality voting where agents nominate just their
most preferred candidate, approval ballots permit agents to
identify multiple candidates that they wish to win. Approval
voting has many desirable properties in the single winner
case (Fishburn 1978; Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver 2006), in-
cluding its ‘simplicity, propensity to elect Condorcet win-
ners (when they exist), its robustness to manipulation and
its monotonicity’ (Laslier and Sanver 2010). However for
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the case of multiple winners, the merits of AV are ‘less
clear’ (Laslier and Sanver 2010). In particular, for the multi-
winner case, AV does address more egalitarian concerns
such as proportional representation.
Over the years, various methods for counting approvals
have been introduced in the literature, each attempt to ad-
dress the fairness concerns when using AV for multiple
winners (Kilgour 2010). One could, for instance, reduce
the weight of an approval from a particular agent based on
how many other candidates the agent approves of have been
elected, as in Proportional Approval Voting (PAV ). Another
way to ensure diversity across agents is vote across a set of
rounds. In each round, the candidate with the most approvals
wins. However, in each subsequent round we decrease the
weight of agents who have already had a candidate elected
in earlier rounds; this method is implemented in Reweighted
Approval Voting (RAV ). Finally, Satisfaction Approval Vot-
ing (SAV ) modulates the weight of approvals with a satis-
faction score for each agent, based on the ratio of approved
candidates appearing in the committee to the agent’s total
number of approved candidates.
These approaches to generalizing approval voting to the
case of multiple winners each have their own benefits and
drawbacks. Studying the positive or negative properties of
these multi-winner rules can help us make informed, objec-
tive decisions about which generalization is better depend-
ing on the situations to which we are applying a particu-
lar multi-winner rule (Elkind et al. 2014). Though AV is
the most widely known of these rules, RAV has been used,
for example, in elections in Sweden. Rules other than AV
may have better axiomatic properties in the multi-winner
setting and thus, motivate our study. For example, each
of PAV , SAV , and RAV have a more egalitarian objec-
tive than AV . Steven Brams, the main proponent of AV in
single winner elections, has argued that SAV is more suit-
able for equitable representation in multiple winner elections
(Brams and Kilgour 2010).
We undertake a detailed study of computational aspects of
SAV , PAV , and RAV . We first consider the computational
complexity of computing the winner, a necessary result if
any voting rule is expected to be used in practice. Although
PAV was introduced over a decade ago, a standing open
question has been the computational complexity of deter-
mining the winners, having only been referred to as “com-
putationally demanding” before (Kilgour 2010). We close
this standing open problem, showing that winner determina-
tion for PAV is NP-hard. Our reduction applies to a host of
approval based, multi-winner rules in which the scores con-
tributed to an approved candidate by an agent diminish as
additional candidates approved by the agent are elected to
the committee.
We then consider strategic voting for these rules. We
show that, even with dichotomous preferences, SAV , PAV
and RAV are not strategyproof. That is, it may be beneficial
for agents to mis-report their true preferences. We therefore
consider computational aspects of manipulation. We prove
that finding the best response given the preferences of other
agents is NP-hard under a number of conditions for PAV ,
RAV , and SAV . In particular, we examine the complexity
of checking whether an agent or a set of agents can make
a given candidate or a set of candidates win. These results
offer support for RAV over PAV or SAV as it is the only
rule for which winner determination is computationally easy
but manipulation is hard.
Related Work
An important branch of social choice concerns determin-
ing how and when agents can benefit by misreporting
their preferences. In computational social choice, this
problem is often studied through the lens of compu-
tational complexity (Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick 1989;
Faliszewski and Procaccia 2010;
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra 2010).
If it is computationally hard for an agent to compute a
beneficial misreporting of their preferences for a particular
voting rule, the rule is said to be resistant to manipulation. If
it is computationally difficult to compute a misreport, agents
may decide to be truthful, since they cannot always easily
manipulate. Connections have been made between manip-
ulation and other important questions in social choice such
as deciding when to terminate preference elicitation and
determining possible winners (Konczak and Lang 2005).
Surprisingly, there has only been limited consideration
of computational aspects of multi-winner elections. Excep-
tions include work by Meir et al. (2008) which considers
single non-transferable voting, approval voting, k-approval,
cumulative voting and the proportional schemes of Monroe,
and of Chamberlin and Courant. Most relevant to our study
is that for approval voting, Meir et al. prove that manipu-
lation with general utilities and control by adding/deleting
candidates are both polynomial to compute, but control by
adding/deleting agents is NP-hard. Another work that con-
siders computational aspects of multi-winner elections is
Obraztsova, Zick, and Elkind (2013), but their study is lim-
ited to k-approval and scoring rules. Finally, the control
and bribery problems for AV and two other approval vot-
ing variants are well catalogued by Baumeister et al. (2010),
demonstrating that AV is generally resistant to bribery but
susceptible to most forms of control when voters have di-
chotomous utility functions.
The Handbook of Approval Voting discusses var-
ious approval-based multi-winner rules including
SAV , PAV and RAV . Another prominent multi-
winner rule in the Handbook is minimax approval
voting (Brams, Kilgour, and Sanver 2007). Each agent’s
approval ballot and the winning set can be seen as a
binary vector. Minimax approval voting selects the set
of k candidates that minimizes the maximum Ham-
ming distance from the submitted ballots. Although
minimax approval voting is a natural and elegant rule,
LeGrand et al. (2007) showed that computing the winner
set is unfortunately NP-hard. Strategic issues and ap-
proximation questions for minimax approval voting are
covered in (Caragiannis, Kalaitzis, and Markakis 2010) and
(Gramm, Niedermeier, and Rossmanith 2003) where the
problem is known as the “closest string problem.”
The area of multi-winner approval voting is closely re-
lated to the study of proportional representation when se-
lecting a committee (Skowron et al. 2013b; 2013a). Ideas
from committee selection have therefore been used in com-
putational social choice to ensure diversity when selecting a
collection of objects (Lu and Boutilier 2011). Understand-
ing approval voting schemes which select multiple winners,
as the rules we consider often do, is an important area
in social choice with applications in a variety of settings
from committee selection to multi-product recommendation
(Elkind et al. 2014).
Formal Background
We consider the social choice setting (N,C) where N =
{1, . . . , n} is the set of agents and C = {c1, . . . , cm} is
the set of candidates. Each agent i ∈ N has a complete
and transitive preference relation %i overC. Based on these
preferences, each agent expresses an approval ballotAi ⊂ C
that represents the subset of candidates that he approves of,
yielding a set of approval ballots A = {A1, . . . , An}. We
will consider approval-based multi-winner rules that take as
input (C,A, k) and return the subset W ⊆ C of size k that
is the winning set.
Approval Voting (AV )
AV finds a set W ⊆ C of size k that maximizes the to-
tal score App(W ) =
∑
i∈N |W ∩Ai|. That is, the set of
AV winners are those candidates receiving the most points
across all submitted ballots. AV has been adopted by sev-
eral academic and professional societies such as the Amer-
ican Mathematical Society (AMS), the Institute of Electri-
cal and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV )
An agent’s satisfaction is the fraction of his or her approved
candidates that are elected. SAV maximizes the sum of such
scores. Formally, SAV finds a set W ⊆ C of size k that
maximizes Sat(W ) =
∑
i∈N
|W∩Ai|
|Ai|
. The rule was pro-
posed by (Brams and Kilgour 2010) with the aim of repre-
senting more diverse interests than AV .
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV )
In PAV , an agent’s satisfaction score is 1+1/2+1/3 · · ·1/j
where j is the number of his or her approved candidates that
are selected inW . Formally,PAV finds a setW ⊆ C of size
k that maximizes the total score PAV (W ) =
∑
i∈N r(|W ∩
Ai|) where r(p) =
∑p
j=1
1
j
. PAV was proposed by the
mathematician Forest Simmons in 2001 and captures the
idea of diminishing returns — an individual agent’s pref-
erences should count less the more he is satisfied.
Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV )
RAV converts AV into a multi-round rule, selecting a can-
didate in each round and then reweighing the approvals for
the subsequent rounds. In each of the k rounds, we se-
lect an unelected candidate to add to the winning set W
with the highest “weight” of approvals. In each round we
reweight each agents approvals, assigning for all i ∈ N
the weight 11+|W∩Ai| to agent i. RAV was invented by
the Danish polymath Thorvald Thiele in the early 1900’s.
RAV has also been referred to as “sequential proportional
AV” (Brams and Kilgour 2010), and was used briefly in
Sweden during the early 1900’s.
Tie-breaking is an important issue to consider when in-
vestigating the complexity of manipulation and winner de-
termination problems as it can have a significant impact on
the complexity of reasoning tasks (Obraztsova et al. 2011,
Obraztsova and Elkind 2011, Aziz et al. 2013). We make the
worst-case assume that a tie-breaking rule takes the form of
a linear order over the candidates that is given as part of the
problem input and favors the preferred candidate; as is com-
mon in the literature on manipulation (Bartholdi et al. 1989,
Faliszewski and Procaccia 2010, Faliszewski et al. 2010).
Note that many of our proofs are independent of the tie-
breaking rule, in which case the hardness results transfer to
any arbitrary tie-breaking rule.
Winner Determination
We first examine one of the most basic computational ques-
tions, computing the winners of a voting rule.
Name: WINNER DETERMINATION (WD).
Input: An approval-based voting rule R, a set of approval
ballots A over the set C of candidates, and a committee size
k ∈ N.
Question: What is the winning set, W ⊆ C, with |W | = k?
Firstly, we observe that WD is polynomial-time com-
putable for SAV , RAV , and AV . Although RAV is
polynomial-time to compute, it has been termed “computa-
tionally difficult” to analyze in (Kilgour 2010). We provide
support for this claim by showing that computing a best re-
sponse for RAV is NP-hard (Theorem 11). We close the
computational complexity of WD for PAV in this section.
Theorem 1 WD for PAV is NP-complete, even if each
agent approves of two candidates.
Proof: The problem is in NP since we merely need as wit-
ness a set of candidates with PAV score s.
To show hardness we give a reduction from the NP-hard
INDEPENDENT SET problem (Garey and Johnson 1979):
Given (G, t), where G = (V,E) is an arbitrary graph and
t an integer, is there an independent set of size t in G. An
independent set is a subset of vertices S ⊆ V such that no
edge ofG has both endpoints in S. For a graphG, we build a
PAV instance for which a winning committee of size t cor-
responds to an independent set inG of size t, and vice-versa.
Consider a graph G = (V,E), and define the following
PAV instance, (N,C,A, k): We have a set of agentsN and
a set of candidates C. For each vertex v ∈ V , we create
deg(G)− deg(v) ‘dummy’ candidates in C, where deg(G)
is the maximum degree of G, deg(G) > 1, and deg(v) the
degree of vertex v. For each v ∈ V , we also create another
candidate in C, labeled Cv . We create an agent in N for
each edge e ∈ E. For each vertex we also create deg(G)−
deg(v) agents. Each of the edge agents approves of the two
candidates corresponding to the vertices connected by the
edge. Each vertex agent associated with vertex v approves
of Cv and one of the dummy candidates associated with v,
thus each dummy candidate has exactly one agent approving
of him. We also set k = t.
We will show that there is a committee of size k = t scor-
ing a total approval of at least s = deg(G) · t if and only ifG
has an independent set of size t. First, note that adding a can-
didate to a committee increases the total score of the com-
mittee by at most deg(G), since at most deg(G) agents see
their satisfaction score rise by at most one. Also, if adding
a candidate c to a committee increases the total score of the
committee by exactly deg(G), then c corresponds to a ver-
tex in G, since each dummy vertex is approved by only one
agent, and the vertex corresponding to c is not adjacent to
a vertex corresponding to any other candidate in the com-
mittee. Thus, the candidates in a committee of size k = t
scoring a total approval of s correspond to an independent
set of size t in G and vice-versa. ✷
The reduction in this proof actually implies a stronger re-
sult, namely that, unless FPT=W[1], WD forPAV cannot be
solved in time f(k) ·mO(1), for any function f , even if each
agent approves of two candidates. This is because it is a pa-
rameterized reduction where the parameter k is a function of
the parameter t for INDEPENDENT SET, which is W[1]-hard
for parameter t (Downey and Fellows 2013). Thus, even for
relatively small committee sizes, a factor mk in the running
time seems unavoidable.
Corollary 1 WD for PAV is W[1]-hard.
Strategic Voting
As in the single winner case, agents may benefit from mis-
reporting their true preferences when electing multiple win-
ners. We consider the special case of dichotomous prefer-
ences where each agent has utility 0 or 1 for electing each
particular candidate. In this case, we say that a multi-winner
approval-based voting rule is strategyproof if and only if
there does not exist an agent who has an incentive to approve
a candidate with zero utility and does not have an incen-
tive to disapprove a candidate for whom the agent has utility
1. We note that for dichotomous preferences, AV is strate-
gyproof (if lexicographic tie-breaking is used). However, it
is polynomial-time manipulable for settings with more gen-
eral utilities (Meir, Procaccia, and Rosenschein 2008). On
the other hand, SAV , PAV and RAV are not.
Theorem 2 SAV , PAV and RAV are not strategyproof
with dichotomous preferences.
Proof: We treat each case separately. We assume that ties
are always broken lexicographically with a ≻ b ≻ c, e.g.,
{a, b} is preferred to {a, c}.
(i). For SAV , assume k = 2, C = {a, b, c}, and agent 1 has
non-zero utility only for a and b. Let,
A2 = {a}, A3 = {a}, A4 = {a}, A5 = {c}, A6 = {b, c}.
The outcome is {a, c} if A1 = {a, b}, but if agent 1 only
approves b, the outcome is {a, b}which has the maximum
utility and is preferred by tie-breaking.
(ii). For PAV , consider the same setting but now with the fol-
lowing votes:
A2 = {b}, A3 = {a, c}, A4 = {a, c}, A5 = {c}.
The outcome {a, b} is only possible if agent 1 approves
only b. Otherwise it is {a, c}.
(iii). For RAV , consider the same setting but now with the fol-
lowing votes:
A2 = {a}, A3 = {a}, A4 = {a}, A5 = {c}, A6 = {b, c}.
The outcome is {a, c} for all reported preferences of agent
1 A1 = {b}, in which case the outcome is W = {a, b}.
This completes the proof. ✷
With SAV , PAV and RAV , it can therefore be beneficial
for agents to vote strategically. Next, we consider the com-
putational complexity of computing such strategic votes.
Name: WINNER MANIPULATION (WM)
Input: An approval-based voting rule R, a set of approval
ballotsA over the set C of candidates, a winning set size k, a
number of agents j still to vote, and a preferred candidate p.
Question: Are there j additional approval ballots so that p
is in the winning set W under R?
Name: WINNING SET MANIPULATION (WSM).
Input: An approval-based voting rule R, a set of approval
ballots A over the set C of candidates, a winning set size
k, a number of agents j still to vote, and a set of preferred
candidates P ⊆ C.
Question: Are there j additional approval ballots such that
P is the winning set of candidates under R?
We note if WM or WSM is NP-hard for a single agent
(j = 1), then the more general problem of maximizing the
utility of an agent is also NP-hard. For AV , the utility max-
imizing best response of a single agent can be computed in
polynomial time (Meir et al. 2008). We note our definitions
have additive utilities, and the question is to cast j votes so
as to maximize the total utility. This is more general than
WM/WSM, since a simple reduction from gives utility 1 to
the candidates in P (or {p}), and 0 to all the other candidates.
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV )
WM under SAV is polynomial-time solvable. The agents
cast an approval ballot for just the preferred candidate. This
is the best that they can do. If the preferred candidate does
not win in this situation, then the preferred candidate can
never win. It follows that we can also construct the set of
candidates that can possibly win in polynomial time. It is
more difficult to decide if a given k-set of candidates can
possibly win. With certain voting rules, this problem sim-
plifies if the optimal strategy of j manipulating agents need
to cast only one form of vote. This is not the case with SAV .
Theorem 3 To ensure a given set of candidates is selected
under SAV , the manipulating coalition may need to cast a
set of votes that are not all identical.
Proof: Suppose k = 3 and C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}, one
agent approves both a and b, and three agents approve d, e,
f and g. If there are two more agents who want a, b and c to
be elected, then one agent needs to approve c and the other
both a and b, or one agent needs to approve a and b, and the
other a and c. ✷
This makes it difficult to decide how a coalition of agents
must vote. In fact, it is intractable in general to decide if
a given set of candidates can be made winners. We omit
the proof for space but observe that it is a reduction to the
permutation sum problem as in the NP-hardness proof for
Borda manipulation with two agents (Davies et al. 2011).
Theorem 4 WSM is NP-hard for SAV .
The proof requires both the number of agents and the size
of the winning set to grow. An open question is the computa-
tional complexity when we bound either or both the number
of agents and the size of the winning set. We can also show
that it is intractable to manipulate SAV destructively.
We can adapt the proof for Theorem 4 to show the follow-
ing statement as well.
Theorem 5 For SAV , it is not possible for a single manip-
ulator to compute in polynomial time a vote that maximizes
his utility, unless P=NP.
Hence, in the case of multi-winner voting rules, de-
structive manipulation can be computationally harder
than constructive manipulation. This contrasts to
the single winner case where destructive manipula-
tion is often easier than constructive manipulation
(Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang 2007). It also follows
from Theorem 5 that it is intractable to manipulate SAV to
ensure a given utility or greater.
We next turn to the special cases of a single agent and a
pair of agents. Winning set manipulation is polynomial with
either one or two agents left to vote. This result holds even
if the size of the winning set is not bounded (e.g. k = m/2).
The proofs are one agent is omitted for space, however we
observe that the proof of the following Theorem can be ex-
tended for the case where a set P has to be a subset of the
winning set.
Theorem 6 If two agents remain to vote, WSM is polyno-
mial for SAV .
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV )
The proof of the NP-hardness of WINNER DETERMINA-
TION for PAV can be adapted to also show that basic ma-
nipulation problems are coNP-hard for PAV .
Theorem 7 For PAV , WM and WSM are coNP-hard,
even if there is no manipulator.
In Theorem 7 the hardness of WM and WSM really comes
from the hardness of WD, demonstrated by requiring no
manipulators. This result motivates us to investigate the
situation where a “real” manipulation is necessary, that is,
whether a single manipulator can include a particular can-
didate in the winning set, even if WD is polynomial-time
computable for the underlying PAV instance. While we
conjecture this is hard, we can formally prove the follow-
ing, slightly weaker, statement.
Theorem 8 For PAV , it is not possible for a single manip-
ulator to compute in polynomial time a vote that maximizes
his utility, unless P = NP .
Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV )
In RAV the decision for a single agent of whom to vote
for in order to maximize his utility is not straightforward.
Suppose we are selecting a committee of size k = 2 with
C = {a, b, c, d}:
A2 = {b, d}, A3 = {c, d}, A4 = {a, b, c, d}
A5 = A6 = {b, c, d}, A7 = {a, b}, A8 = {c}, A9 = {a}.
If the agent wants to elect a to the committee then he may
need to express preference for more than just his choice set.
In the above example, if agent 1, casts the ballot A1 = {a}
then in Round 1 b is elected, in Round 2 c is elected. How-
ever, if the agent casts the ballot {a, d} then in Round 1 d is
elected, and in Round 2 a is elected.
Theorem 9 Under RAV , an agent who wants to include
a single candidate in the committee may have incentive to
approve more candidates than P .
Furthermore, if the agent is attempting to fill a committee
with a preferred set of candidates, he may have incentive
not to approve some candidates so that they may be elected.
Suppose we are selecting a committee of size k = 3 with
C = {a, b, c, d}, using lexicographic tie-breaking:
A2 = {b, d}, A3 = {c, d}, A4 = A5 = A6 = {b, c, d}
A7 = {b}, A8 = {c}, A9 = A10 = {a}.
If the agent has favored set {a, b, d} and he approves all of
them, then in Round 1 b is elected, in Round 2 c is elected,
and in Round 3 a is elected. However, if the agent casts the
ballot {a, d} then in Round 1 d is elected, in Round 2 a is
elected, and in Round 3 b is elected, exactly the favored set.
If a manipulator wants to elect exactly a favored set P
then he must approve either P , or a subset of it.
WD WM WSM
AV in P in P in P
SAV in P in P NP-h
PAV NP-h coNP-h coNP-h
RAV in P NP-h -
Table 1: Summary of computational results for approval-
based multi-winner rules for Winner Determination, Winner
Manipulation, and Winning Set Manipulation.
Theorem 10 Under RAV , an agent who wants to elect an
exact set of candidates will never have an incentive to ap-
prove a superset of his preferred candidates, though he may
have an incentive to approve a subset of them.
Theorem 11 For RAV , WM is NP-hard.
Proof: To show that RAV is NP-hard to manipulate we re-
duce from 3SAT. Given a instance of 3SAT with w variables
Φ = {φ1, . . . , φw}, t clauses Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψt}, inducing
2w literals {l1, . . . l2w}. We construct an instance of RAV ,
(C,A, k) where a manipulator’s preferred candidate p is in
the winning set if and only if there is an assignment to the
variables in Φ such that all clauses are satisfied.
For each variable φi introduce 2 candidates in C, corre-
sponding to the positive and negative literal of that variable,
and 2n − i agents approving of the 2 candidates; note that
n ≫ w + t. For each clause ψj introduce two additional
new candidates, corresponding to the clause being satisfied
or unsatisfied, along with 2n − w − j new agents approv-
ing of both the two new candidates. Additionally for each
clause ψj , we add an agent in A approving each of the can-
didates that correspond to the positive and negative literals
in ψj ; this ensures that both the positive and negative lit-
eral have the same weight of approval in the set of agents.
We also need to add 2 agents approving of the candidate
corresponding to the negation of the clause to maintain the
weighting. Finally, add an extra 2 candidates to C, a and b.
We add 2 agents approving of the candidate corresponding
to a clause being unsatisfied, and 2 agents approving of the
the candidate corresponding to each clause being satisfied
and approving of b
Add t agents approving of a. The size of the winning
set k is equal to |Φ| + |Ψ| + 1. Intuitively, the manipulator
must approve of a setting of all the variables in the original
3SAT instance that satisfies all the clauses, plus the preferred
candidate. We can now see that the manipulating agent is
only capable of ensuring candidate a is elected by computing
a solution to the initial 3SAT instance. ✷
The above proof also shows it is NP-hard to determine if
P can be made a subset of the winning set, P ⊆W .
Conclusions
We have studied some basic computational questions regard-
ing three prominent voting rules that use approval ballots to
elect multiple winners. We closed the computational com-
plexity of computing the winner for PAV and studied the
computational complexity of computing a best response for
a variety of approval voting rules. In many settings, we
proved that it is NP-hard for an agent or agents to compute
how best to vote given the other approval ballots. To com-
plement this complexity study, it would be interesting to un-
dertake further axiomatic and empirical analyses of PAV ,
RAV , and SAV . Such an analysis would provide further
insight into the relative merits of these rules.
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